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Acceptance of payments reinstates mortgage:
Bank of America v La Jolla Group, 2005
Roger Bernhardt
Lender’s acceptance of trustor’s payment curing default on deed of trust reinstated
trustor’s loan, thus rendering later nonjudicial foreclosure sale invalid.
Bank of America v La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 CA4th 706, 28 CR3d 825
The Selesias owned a home in Fresno worth $115,000, and were trustors on a deed of trust
securing a loan of $15,000. When the Selesias missed several payments, Bank of America
(Bank), the lender and trust deed beneficiary, ordered the trustee to record a Notice of Default
and Election to Sell, and a notice that a trustee sale would be held on November 12, 2002. On
November 8, 2002, the Selesias made a payment on the loan, which the Bank accepted,
reinstating the loan. The Bank failed to inform the trustee that the default had been resolved and,
on November 12, the trustee sold the home to La Jolla Group II (La Jolla), a partnership in the
business of buying at foreclosures, for $15,500. Over the next month, La Jolla recorded the deed
(November 20), the trustee notified La Jolla of the mistake (November 25), La Jolla filed an
unlawful detainer against the Selesias (December 3), the trustee recorded a Notice of Rescission
of Trustee’s Deed (December 5) and tendered a refund check to La Jolla (December 9), which La
Jolla refused to accept. Bank sued to cancel the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, and both the trustor
and La Jolla brought related actions. The trial court granted summary adjudication to the Bank,
ruling that the trustee sale and the Deed Upon Sale were both void and invalid, and that the
Notice of Rescission validly put title back to the place it was as of November 20, before La Jolla
had recorded its deed.
The court of appeal affirmed. The essential nature of a trustee’s right to foreclose is a
contractual agreement with the trustor that provides for foreclosure as the beneficiary’s remedy
for the trustor’s default. When the Selesias (trustors) and Bank (beneficiary), after a default,
entered into another contractual agreement to reinstate the loan, Bank no longer had a contractual
basis under which it could exercise the power to foreclose. As a result, the sale was invalid.
The court rejected La Jolla’s argument that the Selesias’ cure was untimely under CC
§2924c(a)(1) and (e) (which provides a trustor the right to cure and reinstate a defaulted loan up
to five business days before the date noticed for the trustee sale). Here, the Selesias’ loan was
reinstated by mutual agreement with Bank, not under the statutory right to cure. The statutory
presumptions of valid title applicable in a valid foreclosure sale cannot apply to render a sale
valid when the beneficiary had no right to exercise the power of sale; accordingly, the issues of
whether the sale was properly noticed and whether La Jolla was a bona fide purchaser were
irrelevant in this matter. At most, the recital in the trust deed that a default had occurred created a
rebuttable presumption regarding default, which was overcome with evidence that the Selesias
and Bank had agreed to reinstate the loan.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: A plethora of variables makes it hard for counsel to give a firm
opinion regarding the effectiveness of recitals in a trustee deed.

The first variable is the nature of the challenged irregularity. Sometimes, trustors
complain because they were not given the notices that the code promises them (see, e.g.,
Little v CFS Serv. Corp. (1987) 188 CA3d 1354, 233 CR 923). Since the most common
version of trust deed recitals deals explicitly with the giving of notices, and since these acts
are usually handled by the trustee itself (who is also doing the reciting), this constitutes its
own category. Irregularities usually involve the behavior of the beneficiary, rather than the
trustee—for example, telling (or allegedly telling) the trustors that they could have more
time to pay (see, e.g., Residential Capital, LLC v Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. (2003)
108 CA4th 807, 134 CR2d 162, reported in 26 CEB RPLR 160 (July 2003)) or, as here,
accepting full payment of arrearages from the trustors and then selling anyway. Conduct
that may come within one particular recital may not fall under another.
In this case, the irregularity was easy to call because the lender accepted the funds.
Technically, trustors lose their rights to reinstate the loan within the last five days before the
sale, and during that time have only the right to redeem, i.e., pay in full. Although the
payment here was tendered with only four days to go, it was nevertheless accepted, making
it easy for the court to hold that the reinstatement period had been contractually prolonged.
This is the customary outcome, and no beneficiary should count on being able to go to sale
once all arrearages have been cured—even if this occurs only a few minutes before bidding
is to start. When the tendered payment is sufficient, refusing it while there is still time may
only worsen matters for the lender. Rejecting a lesser, insufficient payment may be
different, but still risky.
The second variable is what the recitals say. Recitals that purport only to deal with
mailing, publishing, posting, and delivering of notices of default and sale are obviously less
comprehensive than those that add that the trustee complied with all statutory requirements
and performed all its duties; they are far narrower than recitals that make reference to the
fact or nature of the trustor’s default. A recital that covers an irregularity of one type is not
going to be of much help in a case where the irregularity is of a different sort.
In this case, by virtue of a rather narrow reading of what the recitals actually said—and
ignoring inclusion of the phrase “default having occurred”—it was not hard for the court to
hold that recitals of proper mailing said nothing about an agreement to cancel the sale if a
late payment was accepted. In any event, we are all better off that the overbroad language of
Moeller v Lien (1994) 25 CA4th 822, 30 CR2d 777—lumping all recitals together—has
been made manageably narrower.
The third variable is the location of the recitals. Civil Code §2924–which makes some
recitals conclusive–cannot do the job on its own; it operates only if there are, in fact, recitals
in the trustee deed. The effect of the statute is with regard to the recitals enumerated in the
statute; recitals that are in the trustee deed but not mentioned in the statute may have some
nonstatutory effect of indefinite scope. Furthermore, the allowed impact of the recitals in
the trustee deed may also depend on what the deed of trust says about that matter.
Presumably, recitals that were first authorized in the deed of trust and then contained in a
trustee deed have a different effect than recitals that were in one document but not the other

(especially if the deed of trust purports to give them conclusive, rather than merely
presumptive, effect.
The LaJolla opinion gives us the language of the statute and the trustee deed, but does
not reveal what the deed of trust said. That omission may amount to a rejection of the
distinction I just made—or, alternatively, the court may just have not have thought about it.
The fourth variable is how far post sale events have progressed. Theoretically, recitals
play no role when the trustee deed was not delivered at all because the trustee learned of the
problem “in time” and then refused to deliver its deed to the foreclosure purchaser. I have
argued that different standards ought to apply before and after delivery (see my column in
24 CEB RPLR 80 (Mar. 2001)), but I may be alone on that matter. Additionally, even when
the deed has already been delivered, if enough information had come to the attention of the
purchaser before its receipt or recording of the deed, that also could make a difference under
recording act logic. See my comment accompanying the summary of Residential Capital,
supra, in 26 CEB RPLR 161 (July 2003).
Plug in all those variables and all this case may hold is that when a beneficiary
mistakenly goes ahead with a foreclosure sale after having accepted the trustor’s
satisfactory payment, and the trustee drops its hammer and delivers its deed but then seeks
to cancel, the recitals in the deed that the notices had been properly sent will be enough to
save the purchaser’s title. Change a fact or two and who knows what will result? —Roger
Bernhardt

